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Antitrust--Past and Present
By MILTON HANDLER*
Ashley, in his authoritative treatise on the Economic Organiza-
tion of England,' distinguishes four pnncipal stages of economic
development: (1) the family or household system in which the
material needs of an agricultural society are satisfied by the produc-
tion of goods in the farm or manor house; (2) the guild or handi-
craft system in which professional craftsmen produce wares on a
small scale in their own dwellings on a custom made basis for their
consumer-customers; (3) the domestic system or house industry in
which commercial middlemen act as intermediaries between the
makers of goods in small domestic workshops and the ultimate
users; and (4) the factory system in which production is organized
on a large scale in spacious factories equipped with costly ma-
chinery and distribution is controlled by the manufacturers who
supply retail establishments either directly or through marketing
middlemen. It is in the last or final stage that antitrust comes to
the fore. Only the highly developed and industrialized societies
are concerned with restraint of trade and monopoly
Antitrust is the peculiar contribution of the English speaking
world. It is customary to attribute its genesis to a statute enacted
in my country in 1890 bearing the name of Senator Sherman, who
actually was not its real author.' But Canada had an antimonopoly
law as early as 18893 and the legislation of both countries is deeply
rooted in the English common law ' Since World War II, many
countries have paid us the high compliment of emulating our
0 Professor of Law, Columbia University.
'Ashley, The Economic Organization of England 35-36 (1928).
2 See Hamilton & Till, Antitrust in Action 10 (TNEC Monograph No. 16,
1940).
3 Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations m Restraint of
Trade, 1889, 52 Vict. c. 41 Can. And, as Thorelli notes, "Before the enactment
of [the Sherman Act], at least 14 states and territories had incorporated pro-
visions against monopolies, trusts and similar devices to fix pnces or otherwise to
restrict competition in their constitutions, and at least 13 had statutory prohibitions.
Several states even had both constitutional and statutory prohibitions." Thorelli,
The Federal Antitrust Policy 155 (1954).
4 The early common law materials are collected in Handler, Cases on Trade
Regulation c.1 & c.2 §§8, 4 (3d ed. 1960).
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experience by the enactment of comprehensive codes preventing
restrictive trade practices.5 This new corpus of legislation, under-
standably, vanes country by country, and is in no sense a slavish
imitation of American law. It is fair to say, however, that in
general, the basic philosophy of our antitrust jurisprudence has
been accepted, but the statutory details, the methodology of
administration and the procedures of enforcement have been
adapted to the traditions and needs of each particular country
Antitrust, thus, is no longer of parochial interest to American
lawyers alone. It has achieved an international status, or perhaps
I should say, a community of interest among nations.
What I have called the basic philosophy of antitrust was
succinctly epitomized by the Supreme Court of the United States
in a recent judgment:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time ptoviding an
environment conducive to the preservation of our demo-
cratic political and social institutions. 6
Compresser within these few pregnant words are ideas about
which many volumes have been written. It is worth pausing to
appraise the concepts so eloquently articulated by our highest
tibunal. Competition, as the Court points out, is the principal
instrument for the social control of private business activity in a
mature economy such as we have in America. It is the means by
which our material resources are allotted to various social and
economic ends. The market and not the fiat of the state determines
what shall be produced, in what quantity, quality, and at what
price. Since vital decisions are made by the individual and not
by his government, the laws preserving competition constitute a
charter of economic freedom, and are the counterpart of the
5 See Guide to 'Legislation on- Restrictive Business Practices (O.E.E.C.
1960); ECOSOC Council Off Rec. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 11A at 12 (E/2379)(1953); Antitrust Laws: A Comparative Symposium (Fnedmann ed. 1956).6 Northern Pacific By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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political or human freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. In a democracy, economic liberty goes hand in
hand with political freedom; they are interdependent; neither can
prosper without the other. These, in any event, are our articles of
faith; on their verity we have staked our all in the great experiment
in nationhood we have carned on in the western hemisphere since
achieving our independence. I emphasize that these are our articles
of faith; they have more than met the pragmatic test in our ever-
growing, prosperous and dynamic economy; their suitability for
other societies when they reach higher levels of economic develop-
ment is of course a matter for their own determination.
But you must not think we delude ourselves that the competi-
tion which we strive so hard to preserve is a pure and pristine one,
that it is the same in quality, intensity and effectiveness in all
industries, that competition is always beneficent, or that it serves
as an adequate instrument of social control in all fields. There is-
no such thing as perfect competition or complete monopolys ]ust
as there is no such thing as pure socialism. The industrial spectrums
contains many variations of competition. Some industries are
composed of a multiplicity of sellers and buyers and consequently
their operations closely resemble the theoretical textbook descnp-
tions of competition. But there are highly concentrated industries
consisting of a limited number of producers in which competition
functions quite differently Competition, having proven ineffective
as a guardian of the public interest in some industries, is bolstered
by diverse regulatory devices. Sometimes competition is completely
supplanted by pervasive regulatory schemesf Where private mo-
nopoly is countenanced, the public interest is protected through
regulation of prices and quality ° and the legal compulsion to serve
all comers without discrimination.1' And there are areas where the
state steps in and both owns and operates the facilities of produc-
7 Cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).8 See Atty Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 318-19 (1955); Wilcox, Com-
petition and Monopoly in American Industry 1-3, 9-10 (TNEC Monograph No.
21. 1940).
9 See Jones et al., Symposium, Antitrust and the Regulated and Exempt
Industnes, 19 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. 261 (1961); Atty Gen. Nat'l Comm.
Anlitrust Rep. 261-77 (1955); Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries:
Transportation (1961); Note, Regulated Industrnes and the Antitrust Laws, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1958).
10 See Bonbnght, Principles of Public Utility Rates passim (1961).
11 See :d. at 33.
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tion and distribution, either as the sole entcrprisCr' 2 or in competi-
tion with private industry 13
In short, our industrial landscape consists of all types of com-
petitive enterprises, as well as regulated and state operated indus-
tries. Diversity, not uniformity, is the order of the day Antitrust
is one of the methods by which the public welfare is promoted. It
applies to that sector of our economy which is competitively
organized. But the rich arsenal of public control contains instru-
ments by which the greatest good for the greatest number can be
achieved in other ways. These apply to the so-called regulated
industries.
I believe it is fair to say that competition is replaced by other
regulatory procedures when it fails to yield "the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress." It is important for those who are
unfamiliar with the pragmatic approach Americans take to their
public and private problems to bear in mind that we are suspicious
of all absolutes; that we are firm believers ii the art of compromise;
that our concepts are never rigid; and that thev are constantly being
molded to the everchanging needs of our society Competition is
one of our social goals. It is a summum bonum. But it is not a
fetish to which we blindly adhere. Wihile recognizing its significant
social advantages, we endeavor to overcome its shortcomings.
Nevertheless, enforced competition tends to be the rule and special
regulation the exception. For whatever may be its shortcomings,
a competitively organized society means a free economy in whmh
the role of the state is reduced to a minimum. We must never
forget that men were not always free under English law to select a
calling of their own choice, to set up shop in any part of the realm,
to establish their own standards of quality, to choose their own
customers and suppliers, to produce in quantities and stvles of their
own determination and to fix their own prices. 4 These freedoms
were won only after many centuries and are not lightly to be
discarded. Histoncally we started with authoritarian control of
12See Atonc Energy Act, 68 Stat. 929 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §2072 (1958)
(special nuclear material).
13 See e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.
§831 (1958); 28 Stat. 603 (1895), 44 U.S.C. §81 (1958) (Government Printing
Office).14 eeHandler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 36-43.
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private business-first local and then national-and progressed by
revolution and evolution to the modern business system where our
principal reliance is on the automatic operation of competitive
forces, supplemented or supplanted by regulation wherever com-
petition is found wanting. The historical sequence is not from
laissez-faire to state control, as commonly believed, but rather from
a regimented to a free society 15
The object of the antitrust laws, as the Supreme Court pointed
out in the short excerpt which I quoted, is to keep competition
free from collusive restraint and unfettered by monopolistic en-
croachment. The intellectual stuff out of which this vast juns-
prudence has been developed is quite simple. Our basic statute
consists only of two sentences. It declares illegal every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and makes it a
misdemeanor for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with others to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign na-
tions.16 To understand the scope and meaning of antitrust, we
must probe the meaning of the key concepts of restraint of trade
and monopoly
Both of these concepts have an ancient common law lineage.
Restraint of trade at the common law embraced not only the
familiar ancillary contracts not to compete, but also collusive
arrangements among competing businessmen suppressing com-
petition.' 7 The chief concern of the common law with monopoly
related to the illicit crown grants during the reign of the Tudors.'8
As early as the eighteenth century, a rule of reason evolved
validating ancillary agreements not to compete incident to the sale
of a business and its good-will or a contract of employment when
the restriction was limited in time and space.' 9 The precedents
prior to 1890 were not uniform as to whether the rule of reason
applied to non-ancillary or naked agreements affecting competition
such as arrangements fixing prices, dividing territories, controlling
15 See id. at 36-47.
16 Sherrnan Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1958).
17 See Handler, op. cit. supra note 4, c.2 §4.
18 See Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allem), 11 Coke 84, 77 Eng. Rep.
1260 (1602); Thorelli, op. cit. supra note 3, at 25-26.
19Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711);
Handler, Restraint of Trade, Encyc. of Social Sciences 18 (1934).
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production or allocating markets.20 The weight of authority limited
the test of reason to the ancillary covenants. 2'
The questions which perplexed the courts at the common law
continued to vex them after the passage of the Sherman Act of
1890. That statute forbade every restraint of trade. Did this mean
that even the ancillanes were interdicted? Was the law violated
if the prices fixed by agreement among competitors were reasonable
or if the parties to the agreement lacked monopoly power and were
themselves subject to the effective competition of non-members of
the combine? If the word "every" in the statute meant what it
implied, then there was no room for any rule of reason and the
statute achieved a total outlawry of all restrictive programs.
The early years of the statute saw a spirited debate among the
members of the Supreme Court as to whether the inhospitable and
unqualified words of the legislation meant what they said or
whether they were to be moderated by a rule of reason.22 In 1911,
the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice White, in the
landmark Standard Oil of New Jersey decision,23 confined the
prohibitions of the statute to those restraints which unreasonably
restrained trade.
The precise ambit of the rule of reason has been unclear from
its inception. Does it confer censorial power upon the judges to
approve or reject business arrangements on the basis of their
personal predilections-their idiosyncratic and subjective views of
what is good or bad for the economy? Is it up to the judges to
determine whether prices set by private treaties are reasonable? Is
the very existence or the abusive exercise of monopoly power the
hallmark of illegality? Or is the.rule of reason still to be circum-
scribed to the ancillary covenants not to compete?
In his judgment, Chief Justice White treated restraint of trade
and monopoly as synonymous principles. "4 Hence it was inferable
that he intended to differentiate between collusion by those pos-
sessing monopoly power and restrictive action by minority groups
20 See Handler, op. cit. supra note 4, c.2 §§3. 4.
21 See the review of the authorities by Taft, J., in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 284-91 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
22 See the discussion of these decisions in Handler, Antitrust in Perspective c.
I (1957).23 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
141d. at 61.
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faced with and surrounded by vigorous outside competition. Under
this view, illegality would attach to the existence of monopoly
power alone-restraint in the absence of monopoly would be
deemed reasonable and therefore lawful. His opinion was not clear
on this point. Nor was it entirely clear that he was not directing
his censure to the abuse of monopoly power, permitting monopo-
listic combinations restraining trade so long as the public interest
was.not prejudiced by the affirmative acts of the combine. Yet he
took pains to affirm the prior rulings of the Court forbidding
horizontal puce fixing despite the fact that he had himself
dissented in those cases. The earlier decisions, he pointed out,
rested on the proposition that any undue limitation on competitive
conditions was unlawful as a matter of law. 25
These obscurities have been eliminated by the later course
of decision. Agreements suppressing competition are unlawful
whether or not the participants control their market and regardless
of the inherent reasonableness of the restrictions they impose. It
maters not whether the parties may be endeavonng to set a floor
below a ruinous price structure in time of depression26 or to impose
a ceiling on prices in times of a runaway inflation. Such actions
by private groups are unreasonable because they are antithetical to
the free and unfettered competition which the statute presupposes
and seeks to preserve. The legislation not only forbids monopoly
and the abuse of monopoly power, but its condemnation extends
as well to restraints on competition which deny the public the
full benefits of an unfettered competition even though they do
not assume monopoly proportions. Pnce-fixing,28 division of mar-
kets, 20 control of production,30 boycotts,31 tying arrangements by
251d. at 68-68.26 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
27 See United States v. McKesson & Robbms, 351 U.S. 805, 310 (1956)
(dictum); cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211
(1951).
28 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 810 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)..
29 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211, 241 (1899).3 0 A~ex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940) (dictum); Att'y
Cen. Nat 1 Comm. Antitrust Rep. 12 (1955).3 1 Klor s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), discussed im
Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 Colu. L. Rev.
843, 862 (1959).
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dominant sellers,32 vertical pnce agreements3 3 are all beyond the
pale and are denounced as unreasonable per se.
Justice Brandeis during his tenure on the Court unsuccessfully
advocated a different approach to the rule of reason.34 It was his
firm conviction that small business was vital to the very survival
of a democracy such as ours. The object of antitrust, as he saw it,
was to curb big business. Bigness was a curse-whether it be big
business or big government. The large aggregations of economic
power were to be dissolved and reorganized. If small business was
to prosper, it was necessary that it be permitted to engage in some
restraints of trade such as defensive combinations against big
business, resale price maintenance, collection, dissemination and
interpretation of trade statistics, and kindred practices. The test
of legality was not merely whether concerted action restrained
competition among the parties but whether competition in the
industry as a whole was adversely affected. If the quality of com-
petition in the market was not impaired and if the hand of small
business was strengthened, some restraint could well be tolerated,
for without small business, the true goals of a competitively
organized economy were unattainable. Legality thus depended on
the facts of each case with the interest of small business a major
societal concern. This interesting conception of the public interest
in the administration of our antitrust laws never prevailed.
You will get the flavor of the present antitrust thinking of our
courts if I examine closely with you the judgment of Mr. Justice
Stone in United States v Trenton Potteries,"5 a case dealing with
the legitimacy of price-fixing. The narrow issue in Trenton Pot-
teries was whether the rule of reason sheltered a price-fixing agree-
ment by a group controlling eighty-two percent of an industry
where the prices fixed were reasonable. The intermediate appellate
court had set aside a conviction, finding error in the trial court's
32 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), discussed m
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 The Record 417 (1958); Interna-
tional Salt Cb. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
.
3 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944).
34 See e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (dissenting
opinion); Amencan Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 418-19
(1921) (dissenting opinion); and articles and addresses repnnted in Brandeis,
The Curse of Bigness, pt. 3, and Brandeis, Business-A Profession. See Comment,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness: A Dilemma Re-examined, 66
Yale L.J. 69 (1956).
-5 United States v. Trenton Pottenes Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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refusal to submit the issue of reasonableness of the agreed pnces
to the jury In reversing, Stone pointed out that "reasonableness
is not a concept of definite and unchanging content. Our view
of what is a reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by the
recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself."86 That purpose is
to protect the public interest from the evils of monopoly and price
control by the preservation of competition. "The power to fix
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to
control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable pnces.
The reasonable pnce fixed today may through economic and busi-
ness changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. 3 7 It
would be administratively unsound to place on the government
"the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether [the fixed
price] has become unreasonable through the mere vanation of
economic conditions. 38
It is clear upon reflection that agreements among trade nvals
raising prices and limiting entry into their industry are tantamount
to the imposition of a sales tax and the requirement of a license
as a prerequisite of doing business. These sovereign powers of
government should not be vested in private groups to be exercised
for private purposes. They must remain with the state to be
employed for public purposes only And when so employed our
private enterpnse system is transmuted into a regimented economy
Those entrepreneurs who favor private price-fixing sound the death-
knell of the business system as we know it. They force the state to
assume a more active role in the conduct and control of business
affairs.
Careful craftsman that he was, Stone phrased his formulation
of the Trenton Pottenes rule in terms of pnce agreements by a
combine controlling the market. There was no occasion for him
to pass upon the legality of price regulation by a minority group.
In later decisions, however, it has become clear that price-fixing is
unlawful regardless of the economic strength of the combine. The
per se approach of Trenton Pottenes as amplified by Socony-
Vacuum, 9 which condemns any tampenng with pnce structures,
is the anchor point of modern antitrust.
8 Id. at 897.
37 Itnd.
88d. at 898.
89 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
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You might wcll inquire whether the rule of reason in its
application to horizontal combinations among competitors has any
practical significance in the law of today. What conduct does it
shelter?
I put the matter in these terms in a lecture on the "Judicial
Architects of the Rule of Reason," which I gave at the University
of Buffalo:40
[T]he rule of reason, despite its modest pretentions, is far
from sterile. The actual and probable anticompetitive
effects of a challenged arrangement arc carefully measured
to determine whether it will jeopardize the maintenance of
healthy and vigorous competition in the market. Some rc-
strictive agreements, though eliminating competition be-
tween the parties, may strengthen the forces of competition
in the market place. Short-term diminution of competition
may have salutary long-run consequences. The enforcement
of a promise not to compete by the seller of a business or
by an employee enables the purchaser or the employer, as
the ease may be, to compete more effectively with others.
Exclusive dealing arrangements and mergers provide
even more significant illustrations of business practices which
may be used as a technique of waging competition, thus en-
hancing rather than impainng the vitality of the market.
Statistical interchanges can fortify competition by substi-
tuting an underpinning of knowledge for ignorance. Con-
certed action to eliminate fraud, overreaching, and similar
excesses can elevate the plane of competition. Temporary
defensive measures against the encroachments of monopoly
and the ravages of the business cycle, pending appropriate
governmental action, may preserve the competitive system
from extinction. The extent to which such arrangements are
sustained will depend upon whether they, like the Sherman
Act itself, postulate competition as the basic instrument of
social control. The fact that they may operate in the public
interest by promoting social values other than workable and
effective competition will not justify the restraints.
In sum, the more pernicious arrangements are condemned as a
matter of law, whereas novel restrictions outside the per se classifica-
tion are carefully weighed to determine whether they will in the
long run advance or retard the cause of competition. This intro-
duces a needed flexibility into our antitrust laws, enabling them to
4 0 Handler, op. cit. supra note 22 at 26-27 (1957).
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be adapted to changing needs and endows the courts with thc
discretion that is an imperative if our law is to have the capacity
for growth and development. Rigid rules applied as matter of
rote lead only to a stunted and mechanical jurisprudence.
We not only in my country enforce competition, we regulate
it as well. This we do primarily through the Federal Trade Com-
mission, whose responsibility it is to elevate the plane of competi-
tion, to purge the competitive process of chicanery and deceit and
to prohibit unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts and
practices.41 It is also the principal agency enforcing the laws
prohibiting price discrimination.42 An analysis and appraisal of the
strenuous efforts of this arm of government and an exploration
of the myriad details of the law of unfair competition are properly
the subject of many other lectures.
I know you all appreciate that the body of law which I have
endeavored to summarize is replete with interesting detail. Of
necessity I have used broad strokes of the brush. My object has
been to explain why antitrust is a vital aspect of our social and
economic policy and to sketch and review for you its basic pnn-
ciples. Antitrust like all human institutions must face the competi-
tion of rival philosophies in the market place of ideas. As long as
man cherishes freedom, we are confident it will meet this acid test.
41Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Star. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §45 (1958). See Handler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1009-42.42 Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1958).
Current enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act by the Federal Trade Com-
mission is discussed in Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75,
98 (1961).
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